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Abstract
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules
for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare
properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents.
We initiate the study of the computational complexity of an agent manipulating
the PS rule. We show that computing an expected utility better response is NP-
hard. On the other hand, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
a lexicographic best response. For the case of two agents, we show that even an
expected utility best response can be computed in polynomial time. Our result
for the case of two agents relies on an interesting connection with sequential
allocation of discrete objects.
Keywords: Assignment problem, probabilistic serial mechanism, fair
allocation
JEL: C62, C63, and C78
1. Introduction
The assignment problem is one of the most fundamental and important prob-
lems in economics and computer science [see e.g., 3, 4, 6, 12, 13]. In the setting,
agents express preferences over objects and, based on these preferences, the
objects are allocated to the agents. The model is applicable to many resource
allocation or fair division settings where the objects may be public houses, school
seats, course enrollments, kidneys for transplant, car park spaces, chores, joint
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assets, or time slots in schedules. A randomized or fractional assignment rule
takes the preferences of the agents into account in order to allocate each agent
a fraction of the object. If the objects are indivisible but allocated in a random-
ized way, the fraction can also be interpreted as the probability of receiving the
object. Randomization is widespread in resource allocation since it is one of the
most natural ways to ensure procedural fairness [8]. Randomized assignments
have been used to assign public land, radio spectra to broadcasting companies,
and US permanent visas to applicants [Footnote 1, 8].
Among the various randomized/fractional assignment rules, the probabilistic
serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent rules [1, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 19, 17]. PS
works as follows. Each agent expresses a linear order over the set of houses (we
use the term house throughout the paper though we stress any object could be
allocated with these mechanisms). Each house is considered to have a divisible
probability weight of one, and agents simultaneously and with the same speed
eat the probability weight of their most preferred house. Once a house has
been eaten by a subset of agents, these agents proceed to eat their next most
preferred house that has not been completely eaten. The procedure terminates
after all the houses have been eaten. The random allocation of an agent by PS
is the amount of each object he has eaten. Although PS was originally defined
for the setting where the number of houses is equal to the number of agents, it
can be used without any modification for fewer or more houses than agents [see
e.g., 6, 16].
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule fares better than any other random as-
signment rule in terms of fairness and welfare [5, 6, 8, 16, 19]. In particular, it
satisfies strong envy-freeness and efficiency with respect to both stochastic dom-
inance (SD) and downward lexicographic (DL) relations [6, 18, 16]. SD is one
of the most fundamental relations between fractional allocations because one
allocation is SD-preferred over another if for every utility function consistent
with the ordinal preferences, the former yields at least as much expected utility
as the latter. DL is a refinement of SD and based on lexicographic comparisons
between fractional allocations. Generalizations of the PS rule have been recom-
mended in many settings [see e.g., 8]. The PS rule also satisfies some desirable
incentive properties. If the number of objects is at most the number of agents,
then PS is weak SD-strategyproof [6]. Another well-established rule random se-
rial dictator (RSD) is not envy-free, not as efficient as PS [6] and the fractional
allocations under RSD are #P-complete to compute [2]. However, unlike RSD,
PS is not strategyproof.
In this paper, we examine the following natural question for the first time:
what is the computational complexity of an agent computing a different prefer-
ence to report so as to get a better PS outcome? This problem of computing
the optimal manipulation has already been studied in great depth for voting
rules [see e.g., 11]. Ekici and Kesten [10] showed that when agents are not
truthful, the outcome of PS may not satisfy desirable properties related to ef-
ficiency and envy-freeness. Hence, it is important to check that even if agents
can in principle manipulate, how hard it is to compute a beneficial misreport of
their preferences. The complexity of manipulation of the PS rule is also related
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to the study of Nash dynamics and better responses. Efficient algorithms to
compute best responses can be used to understand Nash dynamics under the
mechanism.
In order to compare random allocations, an agent needs to consider relations
between them. We consider three well-known relations between random alloca-
tions [see e.g., 6, 18, 17, 9]: (i) expected utility (EU), (ii) stochastic dominance
(SD), and (iii) downward lexicographic (DL). For EU, an agent seeks a different
allocation that yields more expected utility. For DL, an agent seeks an alloca-
tion that gives a higher probability to the most preferred alternative that has
different probabilities in the two allocations. Throughout the paper, we assume
that agents express strict preferences, i.e., they are not indifferent between any
two houses.
Contributions. We initiate the study of computing best responses for
the PS mechanism — one of the most established randomized rules for the
assignment problem. The study is additionally motivated by complementing
experimental work where we observe that as the number of houses relative to
the number of agents grows, the percentage of manipulable profiles (for which
at least one agent has incentive to manipulate) increases, maximizing at around
99%. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the DL best re-
sponse for multiple agents and houses. For the case of two agents, we present
a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an EU best response for any utilities
consistent with the ordinal preferences. The two-agent case is also of special
importance since various disputes arise between two parties. The result for the
EU best response relies on an interesting connection between the PS rule and
the sequential allocation rule for indivisible objects. In a sequential allocation,
a picking sequence is specified for the agents and agent get his most preferred
available object when his turns comes. For general n, we show that comput-
ing an EU best response is NP-hard. The result contrasts sharply with the
recent result of Bouveret and Lang [7] that a best response can be computed in
polynomial time for sequential allocation.
2. Preliminaries
An assignment problem (N,H,≻) consists of a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n},
a set of houses H = {h1, . . . , hm} and a preference profile ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n)
in which ≻i denotes a complete, transitive and strict ordering on H repre-
senting the preferences of agent i over the houses in H . A fractional assign-
ment is an (n ×m) matrix [p(i)(hj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m such that for all i ∈ N , and
hj ∈ H , 0 ≤ p(i)(hj) ≤ 1; and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∑
i∈N p(i)(hj) = 1.
The value p(i)(hj) is the fraction of house hj that agent i gets. Each row
p(i) = (p(i)(h1), . . . , p(i)(hm)) represents the allocation of agent i. A fractional
assignment can also be interpreted as a random assignment where p(i)(hj) is
the probability of agent i getting house hj .
A standard method to compare random allocations is to use the SD (stochas-
tic dominance) relation. Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) ≻SDi q(i)
i.e., a player i SD prefers allocation p(i) to q(i) if
∑
hj∈{hk:hk≻ih}
p(i)(hj) ≥
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∑
hj∈{hk:hk≻ih}
q(i)(hj) for all h ∈ H and
∑
hj∈{hk:hk≻ih}
p(i)(hj) >∑
hj∈{hk:hk≻ih}
q(i)(hj) for some h ∈ H.
Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) ≻DLi q(i) i.e., a player i
DL (downward lexicographic) prefers allocation p(i) to q(i) if p(i) 6= q(i) and
for the most preferred house h such that p(i)(h) 6= q(i)(h), we have that
p(i)(h) > q(i)(h).
When agents are considered to have cardinal utilities for the objects, we
denote by ui(h) the utility that agent i gets from house h. We will assume that
the total utility of an agent equals the sum of the utilities that he gets from
each of the houses. Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) ≻EUi q(i) i.e.,
a player i EU (expected utility) prefers allocation p(i) to q(i) if
∑
h∈H ui(h) ·
p(i)(h) >
∑
h∈H ui(h) · q(i)(h).
Since for all i ∈ N , agent i compares assignment p with assignment q only
with respect to his allocations p(i) and q(i), we will sometimes abuse the no-
tation and use p ≻SDi q for p(i) ≻
SD
i q(i). A random assignment rule takes as
input an assignment problem (N,H,≻) and returns a random assignment which
specifies what fraction or probability of each house is allocated to each agent.
3. The Probabilistic Serial Rule and its Manipulation
The Probabilistic Serial (PS) rule is a random assignment algorithm in which
we consider each house as infinitely divisible [6, 16]. At each point in time, each
agent is eating (consuming the probability mass of) his most preferred house
that has not been completely eaten and each agent eats at the same unit speed.
Hence all the houses are eaten at time m/n and each agent receives a total of
m/n units of houses. The probability of house hj being allocated to i is the
fraction of house hj that i has eaten. The following example adapted from
[Section 7, 6] shows how PS works.
Example 1 (PS rule). Consider an assignment problem with the following pref-
erence profile.
≻1: h1, h2, h3 ≻2: h2, h1, h3 ≻3: h2, h3, h1
Agents 2 and 3 start eating h2 simultaneously whereas agent 1 eats h1. When 2
and 3 finish h2, agent 1 has only eaten half of h1. The timing of the eating can
be seen below.
0 1
2
Time
13
4
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
h1
h2
h2
h1
h1
h3
h3
h3
h3
The final allocation computed by PS is
PS(≻1,≻2,≻3) =


3/4 0 1/4
1/4 1/2 1/4
0 1/2 1/2

 .
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Consider the assignment problem in Example 1. If agent 1 misreports his
preferences as follows: ≻′1: h2, h1, h3, then
PS(≻′1,≻2,≻3) =


1/2 1/3 1/6
1/2 1/3 1/6
0 1/3 2/3

 .
Then, if u1(h1) = 7, u1(h2) = 6, and u1(h3) = 0, then agent 1 gets more
expected utility when he reports ≻′1. In the example, although truth-telling is
a DL best response, it is not necessarily an EU best response for agent 1.
Examples 1 and 2 of Kojima [16] show that manipulating the PS mechanism
can lead to an SD improvement when each agent can be allocated more than one
house. In light of the fact that the PS rule can be manipulated, we examine the
complexity of a single agent computing a manipulation, in other words, the best
response for the PS rule.1 For a preference profile ≻, we denote by (≻−i,≻
′
i) the
preference profile obtained from ≻ by replacing agent i’s preference by ≻′i. For
E ∈ {SD,EU,DL}, we define the problem E -BR: Given (N,H,≻), compute
a preference ≻′1 for agent 1 such that there exists no preference ≻
′′
1 such that
PS(N,H, (≻′′1 ,≻−1)) ≻
E
1 PS(N,H, (≻
′
1,≻−1)).
For a constant m, the problem E -BR can be solved by brute force by trying
out each of the m! preferences. Hence we will not assume that m is a constant.
We establish some more notation and terminology for the rest of the paper.
We will often refer to the PS outcomes for partial lists of houses and preferences.
We will denote by PS(≻Li ,≻−i)(i), the allocation that agent i receives when his
preference is according to ordered list L. Note that preferences and ordered lists
are interchangeable, except that a list need not contain all houses in H . When
an agent runs out of houses in his preference list, he stops eating. The length
of a list L is denoted |L|, and we refer to the kth house in L as L(k). In the PS
rule, the eating start time of a house is the time point at which the house starts
to be eaten by some agent. In Example 1, the eating start times of h1, h2 and
h3 are 0, 0 and 0.5, respectively.
4. Lexicographic best response
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for DL-BR. Lexi-
cographic preferences are well-established in the assignment literature [see e.g.,
17, 18, 9]. Let (N,H,≻) be an assignment problem where N = {1, . . . , n} and
H = {h1, . . . , hm}. We will show how to compute a DL best response for agent
1 ∈ N . It has been shown that when m ≤ n, then truth-telling is the DL best
response but if m > n, then this need not be the case [17, 18, 16].
Recall that a preference ≻′1 is a DL best response for agent 1 if the fractional
allocation agent 1 receives by reporting ≻′1 is DL preferred to any fractional
1Note that if an agent is risk-averse and does not have information about the other agent’s
preferences, then his maximin strategy is to be truthful. The reason is that if all agents have
the same preferences, then the optimal strategy is to be truthful.
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allocation agent 1 receives by reporting another preference. That is, there is no
preference ≻′′1 such that his share of a house h when reporting ≻
′′
1 is strictly
larger than when reporting ≻′1 while the share of all houses he prefers to h
(according to his true preference ≻1) is the same whether reporting ≻
′
1 or ≻
′′
1 .
Our algorithm will iteratively construct a partial preference list for the
i most preferred houses of agent 1. Without loss of generality, denote ≻1:
h1, h2, . . . , hm.
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denote Hi = {h1, . . . , hi}. A preference of agent 1
restricted to Hi is a preference over a subset of Hi. For the preference of agent
1 restricted to Hi, the PS rule computes an allocation where the preference of
agent 1 is replaced with this preference and the preferences of all other agents
remain unchanged. The notions of DL best response and DL preferred fractional
assignments with respect to a subset of houses Hi are defined accordingly for
restricted preferences of agent 1.
For a house h ∈ H , let PS1(L, h) = (PS(≻L1 ,≻−1)(1))(h) denote the frac-
tion of house h that the PS rule assigns to agent 1 when he reports the (partial)
preference L. We start with a simple lemma showing that a DL best response
for agent 1 for the whole set H can be no better and no worse on Hi than a DL
best response for Hi.
Lemma 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. A DL best response for agent 1 on H gives the
same fractional assignment to the houses in Hi as a DL best response for agent
1 on Hi.
Our algorithm will compute a list Li such that Li ⊆ Hi.
2 The list Li will be
a DL best response for agent 1 with respect to Hi. Suppose the algorithm has
computed Li−1. Then, when considering Hi = Hi−1 ∪ {hi}, it needs to make
sure that the new fractional allocation restricted to the houses in Hi−1 remains
the same (due to Lemma 1). For the preference to be optimal with respect to
Hi, the algorithm needs to maximize the fractional allocation of hi to agent 1
under the previous constraint.
Our algorithm will compute a canonical DL best response that has several
additional properties. A preference Li for Hi is no-0 if Li contains no house h
with PS1(Li, h) = 0. Any DL best response for agent 1 for Hi can be converted
into a no-0 DL best response by removing the houses for which agent 1 obtains a
fraction of 0. For a no-0 preference Li for Hi, the stingy ordering for a position j
is determined by running the PS rule with the preference Li(1)⊕· · ·⊕Li(j−1) for
agent 1, where ⊕ denotes concatenation. It orders the houses from
⋃|Li|
k=j Li(k)
by increasing eating start times, and when two houses h, h′ have the same eating
start time, we order h before h′ iff h ≻1 h
′. Intuitively, houses occurring early
in this ordering are the most threatened by the other agents at the time point
when agent 1 comes to position j. The following definition takes into account
that the eating start times of later houses may change depending on agent 1’s
ordering of earlier houses.
2When we treat a list as a set we refer to the set of all elements occurring in the list.
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Algorithm 1 DL best response for n agents
Input: (N,H,≻)
Output: DL Best response of agent 1
L1 ← h1 // Best response for agent 1 w.r.t. H1 = {h1}
for i = 2 to n do // Compute a best response w.r.t. H2, . . . , Hn
p← 0
if ∃q ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} such that 0 < PS1(Li−1, Li−1(q)) < 1 then
p← max{q ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} : 0 < PS1(Li−1, Li−1(q)) < 1}
end if
for q ← p+ 1 to |Li|+ 1 do // New house hi inserted after position p
L
q
i
← Li−1(1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Li−1(q − 1)⊕ hi
while |Lq
i
| ≤ |Li−1| do // Complete the list according to the stingy ordering
est ← EST(N,H, (Lq
i
,≻2, . . . ,≻n))
S ← {h ∈ Li−1 \ L
q
i
: est(h) is minimum}
hs ← first house among S in ≻1
L
q
i
← Lq
i
⊕ hs
end while
if PS1(Lq
i
, hi) = 0 then
L
q
i ← Li−1
end if
end for
q ← p // Determine which Lq
i
is stingy
worse[p− 1] ← true
finished ← false
while finished = false do
if ∃h ∈ Hi−1 such that PS1(L
q
i
, h) 6= PS1(Li−1, h) then
worse[q] ← true
q ← q + 1
else
worse[q] ← false
if PS1(Lqi , h1) > 0 and PS1(L
q
i , h1) < 1 then
if worse[q − 1] = false then
q ← q − 1
end if
finished ← true
else if PS1(Lq
i
, h1) = 1 then
est ← EST(N,H, (Lq
i
(1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Lq
i
(q − 1),≻2, . . . ,≻n))
if ∃h ∈ {Lq
i
(q + 1), . . . , Lq
i
(|Lq
i
|)} such that est(h) ≤ est(hi) then
q ← q + 1
else
finished = true
end if
end if
end if
end while
Li ← L
q
i
end for
return Ln
A preference Li for Hi is stingy if it is a no-0 DL best response for agent
1 on Hi, and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, Li(j) is the first house in the stingy
ordering for this position such that there exists a DL best response starting
with Li(1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ Li(j). We note that, due to Lemma 1, there is a unique
stingy preference for each Hi.
Example 2. Consider the following assignment problem.
≻1: h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 ≻2: h3, h6, h4, h5, h1, h2
The preferences h3, h1, h4, h2 and h3, h2, h4, h1 are both no-0 DL best responses
for agent 1 with respect to H4, allocating p(1)(h1) = 1, p(1)(h2) = 1, p(1)(h3) =
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1/2, p(1)(h4) = 1/2 to agent 1. When running the PS rule with h3 as the
preference list, h4’s eating start time comes first among {h1, h2, h4}. However,
there is no DL best response for H4 starting with h3, h4. The next house in the
stingy ordering is h1. The preference h3, h1, h4, h2 is the stingy preference for
H4.
The next lemma shows that when agent 1 receives a house partially (a fraction
different from 0 and 1) in a DL best response, a stingy preference would not
order a less preferred house before that house.
Lemma 2. Let Li be a stingy preference for Hi. Suppose there is a hj ∈ Hi
such that 0 < PS1(Li, hj) < 1. Then, P ⊆ Hj, where Li = P ⊕ hj ⊕ S.
The next lemma shows how the houses allocated completely to agent 1 are
ordered in a stingy preference.
Lemma 3. Let Li be a stingy preference for Hi. If hj , hk ∈ Hi are two houses
such that PS1(Li, hj) = PS1(Li, hk) = 1, with Li = P ⊕hj ⊕M ⊕hk⊕S, then
either the eating start time of hj is smaller than hk’s eating start time when
agent 1 reports P , or it is the same and hj ≻1 hk.
Proof. Suppose not. But then, Li is not stingy since swapping hj and hk in Li
gives the same fractional allocation to agent 1.
We now show that when iterating from a set of houses Hi−1 to Hi, the previous
solution can be reused up to the last house that agent 1 receives partially.
Lemma 4. Let Li−1 and Li be stingy preferences for Hi−1 and Hi, respectively.
Suppose there is a h ∈ Hi−1 such that 0 < PS1(Li−1, h) < 1. Then the prefixes
of Li−1 and Li coincide up to h.
We are now ready to describe how to obtain Li from Li−1. See Algorithm 1
for the pseudocode. The subroutine EST(N,H,≻) executes the PS rule for
(N,H,≻) and for each item, records the first time point where some agent
starts eating it. It returns the eating start times est(h) for each house h ∈ H .
Let p be the last position in Li−1 such that the house Li−1(p) is partially
allocated to agent 1. In case agent 1 receives no house partially, set p := 0
and interpret Li−1(p) as an imaginary house before the first house of Li−1. By
Lemma 4, we have that Li−1(s) = Li(s) for all s ≤ p. By Lemma 1, we have
that the fractional assignment resulting from Li must wholly allocate all houses
Li−1(p+ 1), . . . , Li−1(|Li−1|) to agent 1, and allocate a share of 0 to all houses
in Hi−1 \ Li−1.
It remains to find the right ordering for {Li−1(s) : p + 1 ≤ s ≤ |Li−1|} ∪
{hi}. By Lemmas 2 and 3, the prefixes of Li−1 and Li coincide up to h. We
will describe in the next paragraph how to determine the position q where hi
should be inserted. Having determined this position one may then need to
re-order the subsequent houses. This is because inserting hi in the list may
change the eating start times of the subsequent houses. This leads us to the
following insertion procedure. The list Lqi obtained from Li−1 by inserting hi
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at position q, with p < q ≤ |Li| + 1, is determined as follows. Start with
Lqi := Li−1(1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ Li−1(q − 1) ⊕ hi. While |L
q
i | ≤ |Li−1|, we append to
the end of Lqi the first house among Li−1 \ L
q
i in the stingy ordering for this
position. After the while-loop terminates, run the PS rule for the resulting list
Lqi . In case we obtain that PS1(L
q
i , hi) = 0, we remove hi again from this list
(and actually obtain Lqi = Li−1).
The position q where hi is inserted is determined as follows. Start with
q := p. We have an array worse keeping track of whether the lists Lpi , . . . , L
i
i
produce a worse outcome for agent 1 than the list Li−1. Set worse[p−1] := true.
As long as the list Li has not been determined, proceed as follows. Obtain
Lqi from Li−1 by inserting hi at position q, as described earlier. Consider the
allocation of agent 1 when he reports Lqi . If this allocation is not the same for
the houses in Hi−1 as when reporting Li−1, then set worse[q] := true, otherwise
set worse[q] := false. If worse[q], then increment q. This is because, by Lemma 1,
this preference would not be a DL best response with respect to Hi. Otherwise,
if 0 < PS1(Lqi , hi) < 1, then we can determine hi’s position. If worse[q − 1],
then set Li := L
q
i , otherwise set Li := L
q−1
i . This position for hi is optimal
since moving hi later in the list would decrease its share to agent 1. Otherwise,
we have that worse[q] = false and PS1(Lqi , hi) ∈ {0, 1}. This will be the share
agent 1 receives of hi. If PS1(L
q
i , hi) = 0, then set Li := Li−1. Otherwise
(PS1(Lqi , hi) = 1), it still remains to check whether the current position for
hi gives a stingy preference. For this, run the PS rule with the preference
Lqi (1)⊕ · · · ⊕ L
q
i (q − 1) for agent 1. If hi’s eating start time is smaller than the
eating start time of each house Lqi (r) with r > q, then set Li := L
q
i , otherwise
increment q.
Thus, given Li−1, the preference Li can be computed by executing the PS
rule O(m) times. The DL best response computed by the algorithm is Lm.
Since the PS rule can be implemented to run in linear time O(nm), the running
time of this DL best response algorithm is O(nm3).
Theorem 1. DL-BR can be solved in O(nm3) time.
Example 3. Consider the following instance.
≻1: h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7, h8, h9, h10
≻2: h8, h3, h5, h2, h10, h1, h6, h7, h4, h9
≻3: h9, h4, h7, h1, h2, h6, h5, h3, h8, h10
After having computed L2 = h1, h2, the algorithm is now to consider H3. Since
PS1(L2, h1) = PS1(L2, h2) = 1, the algorithm first considers L
1
3 = h3, h2, h1.
Note that h1 and h2 have been swapped with respect to L2 since agent 2 starts
eating h2 before agent 3 starts eating h1 when agent 1 reports the preference
list consisting of only h3. It turns out that PS1(L
1
3, h1) = PS1(L
1
3, h2) =
PS1(L13, h3) = 1. Thus, worse[1] = false. Since h3 does not come first in the
stingy ordering, the algorithm needs to verify whether moving h3 later will still
give a DL best response with respect to H3. It then considers L
2
3 = h1, h3, h2.
However, this allocates only half of h3 to agent 1, implying worse[2] = true. Since
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worse[1] = false, the algorithm sets L3 = L
1
3. The DL best response computed by
the algorithm is L10 = h3, h2, h1, h6.
We note that a DL best response is also an SD best response. One may wonder
whether an algorithm to compute the DL best response also provides us with an
algorithm to compute an EU best response. However, a DL best response may
not be an EU best response for three or more agents. Consider the preference
profile in Example 1. Since the number of houses is equal to the number of
agents, reporting the truthful preference is a DL best response [18]. However,
we have shown a different preference for agent 1 where he may obtain higher
utility.
5. Expected utility best response
In this section, we consider the problem of expected utility best response.
5.1. Case of two agents
We first show that for the case of two agents, an EU best response can
be computed in linear time. The result hinges on a close connection that we
identify between PS and discrete allocation of objects to agents via sequential
allocation. In the sequential allocation setting (N,O,≻′, π), there is an agent set
N , an object set O = {o1, . . . om′}, a preference profile ≻
′ that specifies for each
agent i ∈ N his preferences ≻′i over O, and a policy π : {1, . . . ,m
′} → N . The
sequential allocation rule works as follows. Starting from j = 1 tom′, agent π(j)
gets his most preferred object that is not yet allocated. If no unallocated object
is on the preference list of the agent, then the agent does not get any object when
his turn comes. The assignment as a result of sequential allocation is denoted
by SA(N,O,≻′, π). We will restrict ourselves to the case where N = {1, 2} and
will only consider the alternating policy π∗ = 1212 . . . in which agent 1 starts
first and then the agents keep alternating. The sequential allocation setting was
introduced by Kohler and Chandrasekaran [15] where they showed that the best
response can be computed in linear time when |N | = 2 and the policy is the
alternating sequence. Recently, Bouveret and Lang [7] generalized their result
to the case of any number of agents, any policy, and where the manipulator may
be indifferent between objects.
We highlight a close connection between sequential allocation and PS and
thereby between allocation mechanisms for indivisible and divisible houses. For
the random assignment setting ({1, 2}, H,≻), the half-house reduction gives us
the sequential allocation setting ({1, 2}, O,≻′, π∗). In the reduction, each house
hj ∈ H is cloned so that we have two half-houses h
1
j and h
2
j for each house hj :
O = {h1j , h
2
j : j = 1, . . . ,m}. Both agents have preferences over half-houses that
are consistent with their preferences over houses and for each house, each agent
prefers the first half-house slightly more than the second half-house: if hj ≻i hk,
then h1j ≻
′
i h
2
j ≻
′
i h
1
k ≻
′
i h
2
k. We show that for n = 2, the assignment under
PS is ‘essentially’ the same as the assignment obtained by applying sequential
allocation to the setting resulting from the half-house reduction:
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Remark 1. The assignment PS({1, 2}, H,≻) and the assignment
SA({1, 2}, O,≻′, π∗) are related as follows: PS({1, 2}, H,≻)(i)(hj) =
1
2 · (SA({1, 2}, O,≻
′, π∗)(i)(h1j ) + SA({1, 2}, O,≻
′, π∗)(i)(h2j )).
We note that in the half-house reduction, each preference list ≻′i satisfies the
consecutivity property: half-houses corresponding to the same house are placed
consecutively in the preference list. We will use the consecutivity property in
our argument.
Theorem 2. For the case of two agents, an EU best response can be computed
in linear time.
Proof. We consider the EU best response problem for PS where the manipula-
tor, agent 1, has preferences ≻1: h1, . . . , hm. The main idea is to reduce the EU
best response problem ({1, 2}, H,≻) for PS to the EU best response problem
({1, 2}, O,%′, π∗) for sequential allocation. The reduction is a slight modifica-
tion of the half-house reduction with the difference that agent 1 is indifferent
between two half-houses corresponding to the same house. The object set is
O = {h1j , h
2
j : j = 1, . . . ,m}. In %
′, both agents have preferences over half-
houses that are consistent with their preferences over houses. We will assume
without loss of generality that agent 2 prefers the first half-house slightly more
than the second half-house. Agent 1 is indifferent between any two half-houses
corresponding to the same house: h1j ∼
′
1 h
2
j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} but will be re-
quired to report strict preferences. When we consider sequential allocation, we
will view it in rounds so that in each round, first agent 1 picks a most preferred
available house and then agent 2 picks a most preferred available house.
In the algorithm by Bouveret and Lang [7], when agents have strict prefer-
ences, it is checked whether the manipulator (agent 1) can get different target
sets of objects. In the algorithm, only a linear number of target sets need to be
considered. Given target set Tk which is restricted to objects from o1, . . . , ok, we
can compute target set Tk+1 as follows: check whether target set Tk ∪ {ok+1}
can be achieved or not. Tk+1 = Tk ∪ {ok+1} if Tk ∪ {ok+1} can be achieved
and Tk+1 = Tk otherwise. Tm is then the most preferred allocation that agent
1 achieves and the allocation is unique. When the manipulator is indifferent
among objects, Bouveret and Lang [7] showed that their algorithm can be eas-
ily modified as follows: agent 1 considers a linear order instead of his actual
weak order where the linear order is achieved by breaking ties between the in-
different objects in the same order as the preference of agent 2. Based on this
insight, observe that both agents will pick h1j before h
2
j for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
if they report truthfully.
We first show that there exists a best response of agent 1 in the sequential al-
location setting (N,O,%′, π∗) that satisfies the consecutivity property. If agent
1 either gets both half-houses corresponding to a house or none of them, then his
optimal preference report for sequential allocation trivially satisfies the consec-
utivity property. If this is not the case, then let us consider the most preferred
house hj for which agent 1 gets one of the corresponding half-houses but not the
other. If agent 1 only gets h1j but not h
2
j , this means that in his best response for
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houses restricted to {h11, . . . , h
2
j}, h
2
j was already taken by agent 2 in a round in
which agent 1 picked some other object. Then agent 1 can eventually insert h2j
immediately after h1j in his best response preference knowing well that he will
not get h2j . Thus, the best response for sequential allocation can be modified so
that it satisfies the consecutivity property and yields the same optimal alloca-
tion. Now consider the case where agent 2 gets h1j but agent 1 gets h
2
j . Then
this means that agent 1 cannot get h1j in his best response when his preference
is restricted only to houses from the set {h11, h
2
1, . . . , h
1
j−1, h
2
j−1, h
1
j}. Therefore,
agent 1 can still insert h1j eventually just before h
2
j in his best response so that
the consecutivity property is satisfied and the allocation does not change even
though agent 1 does not get h1j in his best response.
We now show that the best response of agent 1 in the sequential allocation
setting (N,O,%′, π∗) can be used to compute the best response of agent 1 in
(N,H,≻) under PS. Let U be the expected utility for agent 1 under his best
response ≻∗1 in the PS setting. The best response ≻
∗
1 corresponds to ≻
∗
1
′ over
the set of half-houses. By Remark 1, agent 1 achieves essentially the same
allocation and hence the same utility U in the sequential allocation setting if
he submits preference ≻∗1
′. Conversely, if agent 1 achieves utility U in the
sequential allocation setting via a preference report, then he achieves at least
as much utility by reporting his optimal preference ≻∗1
′ constructed via the
algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [7]. Hence, the preference ≻∗1
′ can be modified
as shown above so that it satisfies the consecutivity property. In this case,
there exists a preference ≻∗1 over H which is consistent with the preferences ≻
∗
1
′
over O. If agent 1 reports ≻∗1, then he gets essentially the same allocation as
SA({1, 2}, O, (≻∗1
′,≻′2)(1) and thus gets utility U .
The best response algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [7] returns the same
optimal preference report for all cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal
preference of the manipulator. Next, we point out that for the case of two agents
and the PS rule, a DL best response and an EU best response are equivalent.
Proposition 1. For the case of two agents and the PS rule, a DL best response
is an EU best response and an EU best response is a DL best response.
Proof. For two agents, PS assigns probabilities from the set {0, 1/2, 1}. Hence
DL preferences can be represented by EU preferences where the utilities are
exponential: the utility of a more preferred house is twice the utility of the next
most preferred house. Hence a response is a DL best response if it is an EU
best response for exponential utilities. On the other hand we have shown that
for two agents and the PS rule, an EU best response is the same for any utilities
compatible with the preferences. Hence for two agents, an EU best response for
any utilities is the same as the EU best response for exponential utilities which
in turn is the same as a DL best response.
5.2. General case
We show that an EU best response is NP-hard to compute. The result
contrasts with Theorem 1 which states that a DL best response can be computed
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in polynomial time.
Theorem 3. EU-BR is NP-hard.
Proof. To show hardness we show that the following problem is NP-complete:
given an assignment setting as well as a utility function u : H → N specifying
the utility of each house for the manipulator (agent 1) and a target utility T ,
can the manipulator specify preferences such that the utility for his allocation
under the PS rule is at least T ? We reduce from a restricted NP-hard version
of 3SAT where each literal appears exactly twice in the formula. Given such a
3SAT instance F = (X,C) where X = {x1, . . . , xn} is the set of variables and C
the set of clauses, we build an instance of EU-BR where the manipulator can
obtain utility ≥ T if and only if the formula is satisfiable. At a high level, we
will create an instance of the assignment problem which can be conceptualized
as 18 (mostly) disjoint parts that we index by D ∈ {1, . . . , 18}. We will describe
the main (first) part in detail and explain how it is duplicated to create the
other 17 parts. Each of the 18 parts is divided up into n choice rounds which
we index from 1 to n. For each part there is an additional clause round. The
18 parts are linked by a special set of houses which allow us to synchronize the
timing of the manipulator with respect to all the other agents. The set of agents
is N = {1} ∪
⋃18
D=2{a
D
dummy} ∪
⋃18
D=1A
D
literals where the manipulator is Agent
1, 17 ‘dummy’ manipulators for the 17 copies of the main part, and two agents
for each positive and negative literal in the formula for each of the 18 parts,
ADliterals = {a
1,D
xi
, a2,Dxi , a
1,D
¬xi , a
2,D
¬xi : xi ∈ X}.
The set of houses isH = Hslow∪
⋃18
D=1H
D
rounds∪
⋃18
D=1H
D
clause∪
⋃18
D=2{h
D
CP}∪
{hprize} where Hslow = {h
r
s : r ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}} is the set of slowdown houses
that will be used to control the timing of the manipulator’s decisions. Note
that there is only one slowdown house per round and these houses are shared
between all 18 parts. HDrounds = {h
r,D
xi
, hr,D¬xi : r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} is a
set of houses consisting of one house for each positive and negative literal in the
formula for each of the n rounds; Hclause = {h
1,D
c , h
2,D
c , h
3,D
c : c ∈ {1, . . . , C}}
is a triplet of houses for each clause in the formula; hprize is the prize house for
the manipulator; and
⋃18
D=2{h
D
CP} is the set of consolation prize houses for the
dummy manipulators.
We will describe how to construct the preferences for the main part which
contains the manipulator, agent 1, and then explain the small differences neces-
sary to create the 17 other duplicate instances. Example 4 gives an illustration
of the main part of a small instance and may be helpful for reference during the
discussion.
Main part. We will describe the rounds by declaring which houses are eaten
in them and show how the preference lists of the agents are constructed. Each
agent’s preference list can be described has having a head and a tail. To ease
the description, we will omit the round index D = 1 in the variable names.
Intuitively, the head consists of the houses that the agent will consume during
the running of the PS algorithm while the tail consists of houses that will not
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be eaten. When we describe how we add houses to an agent’s preference list,
we will say append the house(s) to the head to mean add this set of houses to
the end of the head of the preference list, behind those that have been placed
before. We say append the house(s) to the tail of the preferences to mean place
them last amongst all houses which have been placed in the preferences so far.
In each choice round r, houses hrxi and h
r
¬xi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} will
be eaten. Append those houses to the head of the preferences of the agents
corresponding to the same literal and append them to the tail of the preferences
of agents associated to a different literal. Append houses hrxr and h
r
¬xr to the
head of the manipulator’s preferences (the order in which we add them in is not
important). Houses hrxi and h
r
¬xi where i 6= r are appended to the tail of the
manipulator’s preferences. In each choice round except the last one, slowdown
house hrs will be eaten. We append it to the tail of the preferences of the literal
agents, and to the head of the preferences of the manipulator agent (after the
literal houses we added for this round).
Finally we describe the clause round. For each clause, we have the 3 houses
h1c , h
2
c , h
3
c . We append these 3 houses to the head of the preferences of exactly 1
agent corresponding to the negation of each of the clause c’s literals. If an agent
has already had houses added to his preferences in the clause round, we add
them to the other agent corresponding to the same literal (since a literal appears
only twice in the formula, this ensures each agent has only one triplet of houses
appended to the head of their preferences). The prize house hprize is appended
to the head of both the manipulator’s and the literal agents’ preferences (after
the clause houses we just added to the literal agents).
Duplicate parts. For each of the duplicate parts, D ∈ {2, . . . , 18}, we will de-
scribe the necessary modifications. For clarity we call the copy of the prize house
in the duplicated parts of the instance consolation prize houses denoted hDCP for
each D ∈ {2, . . . , 18}. Recall that the set of slowdown houses Hslow is shared
between all the parts; thus all the parallel constructions ‘merge’ at the set of
slowdown houses. We are left with the fact that houses from a given duplicate
part D of the instance have not been added to the preferences of agents from
all other parts of the instance. We can append all these houses to the tail of
the preferences of the agents outside this part in any order.
The manipulator’s utilities. We will give the manipulator’s utility in terms of
a number α to be fixed later. The prize house has utility 1. The literal houses
that are appended to the head of the manipulator’s preferences during round i
(hixi and h
i
¬xi) have utility (2α)
2(n−i) and (2α)2(n−i)+ ǫ where ǫ is O( 12n ). The
slowdown houses have utility (2α)2(n−i−1)+1. All other houses have negligible
utility. By negligible we mean that adding up all their combined utilities will
yield less than 1
α
utility. This can be done since we have a polynomial number
of houses and we can make the utilities exponentially small.
Based on these utilities we can now derive a target value for T and anal-
yse the behaviour that the manipulator must have to reach that target. The
manipulator may only start eating a new house once the house he is currently
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eating is no longer available. This means that if he starts eating a house, he
is ‘stuck’ eating said house for a certain amount of time. We now constrain
the manipulator’s possibilities by showing that by diverging from the literal
and slowdown houses he should be eating according to his preferences, he will
commit to a house for which he has exponentially less utility for an amount of
time which is at least some constant. By setting α to be large enough, we can
ensure that this loss in utility is irrecuperable. We say the manipulator behaves
as prescribed if he declares preferences which correspond to his true preferences
up to permutations of the literals associated with one same variable.
Let t1 > 0 be the smallest amount of time the manipulator will eat a new
house if he has behaved as prescribed in all his previous choices. The next
lemma shows that t1 is independent of the instance size.
Lemma 5. t1 ∈ O(1).
Proof. As the algorithm progresses, we may group the agents in a constant
number of groups based on the extent they have eaten their current house when
the manipulator finishes consuming one of his houses and the number of agents
eating that house. Each group is associated with a value, which corresponds to
the amount of time the manipulator would have to spend if he decided to eat
a house currently being eaten by members of that group. By showing that the
number of these groups is constant, and therefore so is the number of values, we
show that t1 is a constant. The groups can be characterized by the type of house
that the members are eating. At any point in the algorithm we say that a literal
has been chosen by the manipulator if the round r is greater than the index i
of that literal, r > i. We say that a literal is untouched by the manipulator for
i > r. The groups are defined as follows: 1) Agents eating houses being eaten by
an agent corresponding to a literal which has been chosen by the manipulator
2) Agents eating houses being eaten by an agent corresponding to a literal
which is the negation of one chosen by the manipulator 3) Agents eating houses
corresponding to literals untouched by the manipulator 4) Agents eating houses
being eaten by dummy manipulators.
At the start of any round i, eating a house from group j would take gj1 time.
The manipulator then finishes eating the first literal, and eating a house from
group j would take gj2 time. After eating the second literal, eating a house from
group j would take gj3 time. Finally the manipulator eats the slowdown houses
and we have corresponding value gj4. We will now show that the values for g
j
l
are the same for all rounds. To show this we simply need to make sure that
all the agents stay ‘synchronised’. It takes the manipulator 0.5 units of time
to finish the current round (13 on the first literal,
1
9 on the second, and
1
18 on
the slowdown house). Let us now show that it also takes 0.5 units of time for
every other group to get to the same point in the next round. The exception are
the agents eating a house that is also being eaten by the manipulator or some
dummy in that round, which fall out of sync with their previous group (group
3 or 4) and transit either to group 1 or 2. For groups 1-3, all these agents pair
up and have 1 house per round. It therefore takes them each 0.5 time to eat
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it. For Group 4, the dummy manipulators eat a first literal (13 ) then a second
(19 ) and finally all 18 manipulators join together and eat the slowdown houses
in the round, which takes them time 118 . This adds up to
9
18 = 0.5.
Corollary 1. There is value for α ∈ O(1) such that the manipulator behaves
as prescribed.
Lemma 6. In the clause round all agents corresponding to literals chosen by the
manipulator start the round at the same time as the manipulator, whilst agents
corresponding to negation of the choice of the manipulator are in advance and
start the round 19 units of time before the manipulator.
Proof. In Lemma 5 we argued that the agents took the same amount of time to
finish a round. The exception to this is the last round where the manipulator
does not eat any slowdown houses and therefore finishes the round at the same
time as group 1. Group 2 finishes the round 19 before group 1 since the manip-
ulator spent 13 time eating a house with them whereas he spent
1
9 time eating a
house with agents from group 2. This results in a 49 −
3
9 =
1
9 delay between the
two.
The manipulator’s choice corresponds to an assignment of the variables in
the SAT formula. If the manipulator chose to eat house hrxr before h
r
¬xr then
this corresponds to setting xr to true (and vice versa). Thus, in each round
the manipulator choses an assignment for a variable in the formula. The target
utility T is the sum of 49 of the utility of h
r
xr
and 118 of the utility of the slowdown
house hrs (except in the last round) for each round r and an extra
25
27 .
Lemma 7. In the clause round, the manipulator must eat the prize house before
any other agent to reach the target utility T .
Lemma 8. F is satisfiable iff the manipulator can reach the target utility T .
Proof. (⇒) We have set T so that if the manipulator declared a prescribed
preference profile, he will require an extra 2527 − ǫ · n utility to reach T . If all
clauses are satisfied, at most 2 of the agents eating the houses corresponding to
a clause will be in advance and the manipulator will have 2527 units of time to eat
the prize house alone. The manipulator will always have 89 units of time to eat
the prize house alone while the other literal agents are eating the corresponding
clause houses. In the worst case, 2 agents are in advance for any clause by 19 ,
units of time, which means that they, along with the third agent in the clause,
will finish their triplet of clause houses after 89 +
1
27 units of time, at which time
all three agents will begin eating the prize house. This leaves the manipulator
to eat alone for 127 extra time thus ensuring him extra utility ≥
25
27 .
(⇐) If the truth assignment causes a clause to be unsatisfied, the agents corre-
sponding to the negation of the literal in the clause (and therefore eating the
clause houses corresponding to the clause) will all be in advance and will finish
eating the clause houses before the manipulator has eaten 2527 of the prize house.
If all 3 agents are in advance, they will finish eating the clause houses 2427 units
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of time after the manipulator has started eating the prize house. Therefore for
3
27 of the prize house there are at least 3 extra agents eating the prize house.
Since this makes at least 4 agents eating 327 of the prize house, the manipulator
will get at most 136 instead of the required
1
27 of the prize house after he has
eaten a share of 2427 . Since the prize house is the only remaining house with
non-negligible utility, and we have made α large enough, he cannot compensate
this loss of utility by getting more of some other house.
The reduction can be used to show that even checking whether there exists
any report that yields more utility than the truthful report is NP-hard.
Example 4. We illustrate the reduction in the proof of Theorem 3. For the
following SAT formula, the table below illustrates the preference profile for the
agents in the main part. Houses not shown in the preferences are never eaten
by the agents and come later in the preference lists.
(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c1
(¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c2
(x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c3
(¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c4
choice round 1 choice round 2 choice round 3 clause round
1 h1x1 , h
1
¬x1 h
1
s h
2
x2
, h2¬x2 h
2
s h
3
x3
, h3¬x3 hprize
a1x1 h
1
x1
h2x1 h
3
x1
h1c2 , h
2
c2
, h3c2 hprize
a2x1 h
1
x1
h2x1 h
3
x1
h1c4 , h
2
c4
, h3c4 hprize
a1¬x1 h
1
¬x1 h
2
¬x1 h
3
¬x1 h
1
c1
, h2c1 , h
3
c1
hprize
a2¬x1 h
1
¬x1 h
2
¬x1 h
3
¬x1 h
1
c3
, h2c3 , h
3
c3
hprize
a1x2 h
1
x2
h2x2 h
3
x2
h1c2 , h
2
c2
, h3c2 hprize
a2x2 h
1
x2
h2x2 h
3
x2
h1c3 , h
2
c3
, h3c3 hprize
a1¬x2 h
1
¬x2 h
2
¬x2 h
3
¬x2 h
1
c1
, h2c1 , h
3
c1
hprize
a2¬x2 h
1
¬x2 h
2
¬x2 h
3
¬x2 h
1
c4
, h2c4 , h
3
c4
hprize
a1x3 h
1
x3
h2x3 h
3
x3
h1c2 , h
2
c2
, h3c2 hprize
a2x3 h
1
x3
h2x3 h
3
x3
h1c4 , h
2
c4
, h3c4 hprize
a1¬x3 h
1
¬x3 h
2
¬x3 h
3
¬x3 h
1
c1
, h2c1 , h
3
c1
hprize
a2¬x3 h
1
¬x3 h
2
¬x3 h
3
¬x3 h
1
c3
, h2c3 , h
3
c3
hprize
6. Conclusions
We conducted a detailed computational analysis of strategic aspects of the
PS rule. Since PS performs better than RSD in terms of efficiency and envy-
freeness, the only drawback it has in comparison with RSD is its manipulability.
We have shown that although PS is manipulable, finding an optimal manipula-
tion is a complex task for an agent even if he has complete knowledge about the
preferences of other agents. There is scope to conduct detailed experiments on
the pecentage of instances that are manipulable and the extent and effects of
manipulation. Initial experiments show that manipulation is often possible and
more often decreases social welfare than increases it, though the overall effect
is small. As the number of houses relative to the number of agents grows, the
opportunities to manipulate increase, maximizing around 99%. It will be inter-
esting to extend our results to the extension of PS for indifferences [14]. Finally,
studying coalitional manipulations and a deeper analysis of Nash dynamics are
other interesting directions.
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